THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF
AMERICAN INDIAN LEGAL PROBLEMS
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Few people realize that American Indians comprise the only minority
group which possesses a special legal status within the United States. Although they are citizens like everybody else, they are also, by virtue of their
tribal affiliations, possessed of special rights. This special status has puzzled
and sometimes irritated white Americans. Indeed, so august a body as the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam
County observed: 1
Although the natural dignity of the American Indian as a person and a
citizen, his valor as a warrior, and his contributions to this country, military
and civil, cannot and ought not be denied, one wonders, as he reads the case
law on Indian matters, whether the law has not conferred upon tribal Indians
and their descendants what amounts to titles of nobility, with all that entails,
in contravention of Article 1, § 9, of the United States Constitution prohibiting such titles. But this is a cquestion beyond our jurisdiction.
While strong support for this special legal status of the American Indian is
not immutable, Indian tribes presently enjoy what can be described as "internal sovereignty" or "local autonomy" in their respective jurisdictions. This
paper will attempt to show how this status derives directly from the peculiar
historical experiences of Indians and whites in the New World.
The experience of Indian-white relations in the United States has always
differed from that in other parts of this hemisphere. In Latin America, for
example, the relationship between Europeans and natives did not allow tribal
autonomy to persist as it has in the present area of the United States. Physical
destruction of large portions of the massive native populations was more
overwhelming; physical integration of those who survived was more complete.
Spanish and Portuguese policy did not allow the same degree of native legal
existence apart from the institutions of the dominant society.
In British America, on the other hand, the colonists treated many of the
Indian groups as independent nations with whom formal treaties and agreements were made. This policy was followed despite the fact that the Crown
claimed ultimate sovereignty in all lands discovered and to be discovered
when it granted royal charters and letters patent to those exploring or settling
in the New World. The assertion of sovereignty over the lands of the New
* Director, Office of American Studies, Smithsonian Institution.
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World was directed primarily at competing European states, who denied each
other's pretensions to sovereignty over lands casually explored or lightly settled. Occupation rather than discovery increasingly became the only proof of
sovereignty recognized by Europeans in their dealings with one another.
Against the Indians the claim to European sovereignty was not pressed until
much later, after Indian nations had lost their original power and could not
contest the assertion of European title.2
The ambiguities inherent in the European policy were gradually clarified.
In North America, the doctrine of the right of preemption was developed to
stem the confusion. By this doctrine, most effectively articulated by Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of War Henry Knox in the 17 90s,
the Indian nations maintained full possession of their lands, but the United
States retained the exclusive right to purchase any Indian land when the Indians chose to sell. In addition, of course, conquest of land in a just war was a
valid method of acquisition. Although the concept of a just war is associated
primarily with medieval theorists, in fact the doctrine, without ecclesiastical
sanction or interpretation, continued to inform legislatures in British America
3
before and after the Revolution.
Why were Indian nations allowed to retain their separate and distinct
status? First, English settlements did not result from a single impulse; nor
were they under unified control. Charter colonies, proprietary colonies, and
royal colonies, each with separate links and responsibilities to the mother
country, found themselves dealing with local Indian nations of varying power
and uncertain disposition. Each colony, separated from England by a vast
ocean, had to determine how best to deal with the native inhabitants they
encountered. Second, there was no agreement on what law applied to Englishmen who went abroad: indeed, it took a revolution to determine what
rights the colonists had in the New World. Third, there was no coherent system of law spelling out the relationship that was to be established with Indians. The English had no compilation similar to the Spanish Laws of the
Indies to guide them in their relations with the Indians.' As a result, Indian
nations in North America were able to deal with the English (and their
2. See generally W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW:
PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (197 1).
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American successors) largely in terms of ad hoc problems, since the English
tended to base their decisions on expediency rather than abstract theory.
Many of the Puritan divines and colonial governors sought to justify their
claims to Indian lands by arguing that European farmers had a right to settle
in areas that were incompletely possessed by nomadic hunters or insufficiently
utilized by native agriculturalists. In such Puritan writings as John Cotton's
God's Promise to his Plantation,5 this claim was grounded in divine sanction. In
later years, stripped of its theological overtones, it would reappear in Theodore Roosevelt's assertion: "This great continent could not have been kept as
nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages." 6
Despite such theologically tinged arguments most of the colonists' dealings
with the American Indian were effected through a variety of practical agreements. These agreements accepted the right of the Indian to possess the land
to which he laid claim, although such lands were subject to transfer to whites
by virtue of war, sale, or the disappearance or departure of the original inhabitants. Purchase was probably the principal means by which Indians transferred the land title of the present area of the United States to whites. Felix
Cohen, the great authority on Indian law, noted that up to 1947 some
$800 million of federal funds had been appropriated for the purchase of
Indian lands. The federal government had not always honored the principle
of respect for Indian possessory rights, Cohen pointed out, but few other
countries could boast a better record. 7 To compensate for the many instances
of the government's failure to deal honorably with the Indian, Congress, in
1946, created the Indian Claims Commission. The Commission continues to
hear claims in law and equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties,
and executive orders, as well as claims that would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual
or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact. Indeed, the powers of the
Commission extend to hearing claims based upon "fair and honorable deal8
ings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity."
Although direct purchase of land by English colonists was not uncommon,
most of the agreements between whites and Indians took the form of a treaty.
Treaties could be either oral or written, and it was with great solemnity and
formality that the colonists entered into them. For example, the negotiations
between Plymouth colony and the Wampanoags commenced, in the spring of
1621 when, as a Pilgrim chronicler noted, Massasoit, the Wampanoag chief,
was ushered 9
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• ..to an house then in building, where we placed a green rug and three or
four cushions. Then instantly came our Governor, [John Carver, who died
shortly after] with drum and trumpet after him, and some few musketeers.
After salutations, our Governor kissing his hand, the King kissed him; and so
they sat down. The Governor called for some strong water and drunk to him;
and he drunk a great dratight, that made him sweat all the while after.
Squanto, an Indian who had learned English in England after being kidnapped by an English ship captain, served as interpreter. Carver's successor,
William Bradford, later recorded the terms of the peace:'
1. That neither he nor any of his should injure or do hurt to any of their
people.
2. That if any of his did hurt to any of theirs he should send the offender,
that they might punish him.
3. That if anything were taken away from any of theirs, he should cause it to
be restored; and they should do the like to his.
4. If any did unjustly war against him, they would aid him; if any did war
against them, he should aid them.
5. He should send to his neighbours confederates to certify them of this, that
they might not wrong them, but might be likewise comprised in the conditions of peace.
6. That when their men came to them, they should leave their bows and
arrows behind them.
The peace concluded in the treaty of 1621 was faithfully kept throughout
the lives of Massasoit and Governor Bradford. The peace began to unravel,
however, after the Englishman's death in 1657 and the Indian's in 1660. Relations between the colony and Philip, the successor to WamstItta (who had
succeeded Massasoit), deteriorated as misunderstanding was piled upon insult.
In 1671 the treaty relationship between the Indians and Plymouth was renegotiated, as a result of which the Wampanoags became virtual subjects or
pawns of the colony."' Our knowledge of the Indian reaction to the Pilgrim
moves is clouded, but there seems no doubt that the resulting "conspiracy"
and war which ravaged New England derived from a desperate feeling on the
part of the Indians that the autonomy they had enjoyed in earlier years had
been destroyed, and that their only hope of honorable survival lay in war. 2
The treaty form of negotiating differences between Indians and whites has
frequently been the object of ridicule or shame. Too often laymen and historians alike have assumed that such negotiations were either a farce or a
fraud, in the course of which scheming white men imposed their terms upon
simple-minded Indians. The classic example, hallowed in the annals of popular culture (whose influence on our understanding of the subject should not
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be overlooked) is the purchase of Manhattan Island by the Dutch for twentyfour dollars from the local Indians. While instances of fraud and deceit in
treaty making are not lacking, it must be remembered, particularly for this
formative period in American history, that the treaty process was one in
which whites and Indians, bargaining from varying positions of strength and
weakness, sought agreements or concessions each regarded as desirable or
necessary. Often the Indians placed greater value on trade items, such as
guns and beads, than on marginally used lands. 1 3 Thus, agreements reflected
14
different values and interests as well as differences of power.
With the achievement of national independence the government of the
United States was faced with the question of how seriously treaties with the
Indians should be regarded. The Constitution granted the President the
power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make
Treaties."' 5 No distinction was made between treaties with Indian nations and
those with foreign powers. In a communication to the Senate, dated September 17, 1789, President George Washington wrote: "It doubtless is important that all treaties and compacts, formed by the United States with other
nations, whether civilized or not, should be made with caution, and executed
with fidelity."' 16 Washington and his early successors attempted to execute Indian treaties faithfully, although they were often frustrated by the inability of
the federal government to prevent state or local action against Indian groups
in violation of earlier treaties.
The fact that not all Americans agreed with George Washington is implicit
in the way in which the President's communication was phrased. A steady
undercurrent of disagreement with the treaty process surfaced in the nineteenth century, particularly among individuals like General Andrew Jackson,
who, as an army officer and territorial governor in the years following the
War of 1812, had frequently been called upon to negotiate Indian treaties.
Jackson increasingly came to feel that dealing with Indians in formal treaties
was "an absurdity" and an anachronism. t7 It is true that as Indian power
13. Washburn, Symbol, Utility, and Aesthetics in the Indian Fur Trade, 40 MINN. HIST. no. 4, at
198-202 (1966).
14. It is noteworthy that treaty negotiations were conducted in the Indian style of address and
tended to proceed at an Indian pace. This was not, I would assert, an expression of condescension on the part of the whites. It was rather the necessary pre-condition to successful negotiations
with the Indians who continued in a powerful position throughout the early centuries of contact

with the whites. Indeed, the whites' willingness to utilize the Indian form of negotiation rather
than to insist on European forms suggests a grudging admiration for the eloquence and dignity
of the Indian adversaries they faced. Benjamin Franklin was so impressed with the eloquence of
the native inhabitants that he published the text of a number of the early Pennsylvania Indian
treaties. See, e.g., INDIAN TREATIES PRINTED BY BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1736-1762 (J. Boyd ed.
1938). See generally W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 99-100 (1975).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
16. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, CLASS II, INDIAN AFFAIRS 58 (1832). See generally W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES (1973).
17. R. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 10 (1975).
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declined and white power increased the consequences of breaking or ignoring
earlier Indian treaties became less serious. Nevertheless treaties continued to
be made in good faith until 1871, when a rider to a House of Representatives
appropriation bill ended the process for the future even while acknowledging
the validity of treaties made in the past.'
In the mid-nineteenth century, as white settlers rapidly moved westward,
the autonomy of the western Indian nations suffered a series of blows. Implicit in the concept of the autonomy of the western Indian nations was the
idea of an "Indian Barrier," fixed at the western boundary of the existing
white settlements, beyond which all Indians would live free from white control. As white settlers penetrated this barrier, the federal government trailed
behind, trying to provide a viable and stable relationship between the white
newcomers-whether trappers, traders, miners, ranchers, missionaries, or
agriculturists-and the affected Indian tribes.
The expedient seized upon by the government in the 1840s and 1850s to
meet the new situation was the creation, by treaty, of a series of reservations
which would serve to concentrate the various Indian nations away from the
major paths of white westward movement. Isolation would also make it easier
for government officials and missionaries to implement programs for "civilizing" the native populations. Once again American policy in this period was
hastily improvised in response to a series of specific problems. Although
framed in theoretical terms, the policy was not an expression of a coherent
political or philosophical doctrine but a practical response to white pressure
on the "permanent Indian barrier." '
The destruction of many of the reservations at the end of the nineteenth
century resulted from a similar expedient response to the pressure of white
settlers on the reservations created in the 1840s. The crisis came to a head in
the 1870s with the continuing rapid expansion of white population. The new
weapon in the white arsenal was the railroad, which provided a physical presence of white power in the heart of the Indian country and guaranteed rapid
movement of white military power wherever needed. Indian lands, though
seemingly protected by the treaties negotiated in the 1840s and 1850s, were
increasingly subject to invasion by undisciplined and unregulated frontiers18. The end of the treaty making process was, interestingly enough, largely the result of the
insistence of Henry L. Dawes. When chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of
Representatives, Dawes stipulated that the Senate do away with the treaty system as the price for
obtaining appropriations from the House for carrying out the government's obligations to the
Indians. Dawes's purpose, it has been argued, was to break up the treaty system as the first step
toward general allotment of Indian lands, a goal reached in the Dawes Act of 1887, passed when
Dawes was a member of the United States Senate. W. WASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN
TRIBALISM: THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT LAW (DAWES ACT) OF 1887, at 25 (1975), quoting from F.
Nicklason, The Early Career of Henry L. Dawes, 1816-1871, at 369 (unpublished thesis at Yale
University 1967).
19. See R. TRENNERT, ALTERNATIVE TO EXTINCTION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE RESERVATION SYSTEM, 1846-1851 chs. 1-4 & epilogue (1975).
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men. Miners rushed into the Black Hills of the Sioux Reservation in search of
gold. Stockmen and settlers invaded the homelands of the Utes of Wyoming
and the Nez Perce of Washington and Idaho. Even the Indian Territory, inhabited by Indians who had been coerced or induced into moving west to
form the prototype of a separate Indian state or territory, was under constant
threat of invasion by white ruffians perched on its borders. The outcome of
this pressure was occasionally war. Chief Joseph and his Nez Perce were
humbled and defeated in 1877. Even the Sioux, though they destroyed
George Custer's Seventh Cavalry Regiment, gained only temporary satisfaction before being crushed by larger forces. These military confrontations were
the outward expressions of a crisis that seemed to men of both good and ill
will to require radical solutions.
The solution proposed was to break up the reservations by dividing the
communally held lands into individualized parcels. Tribal members would be
given enough land to allow them to become farmers. The surplus remaining
after individual allotments were made would be sold to whites, the proceeds
going to assist in the educational and "civilizational" process by which Indians
would be integrated into white society. The proposal received wide support,
not only from those who were eager to obtain Indian lands but from white
people of good will, frightened by the invasion of Indian lands, who formed
Indian rights organizations and agitated for a solution to the dilemma.
Viewed in the most favorable light, the "friends of the Indians" sought to save
the Indians from destruction by authorizing the government to take from
them some of their lands in exchange for a stronger title to the remainder.
The surplus land would be sold to appease the land-hungry white settlers
who, it was argued, might otherwise overrun the reservations and completely
dispossess the Indians. Profits" from the sale of the lands would go to support
2
the adjustment of the Indians to their new condition in life. 11
The proposal was enacted into law with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887, popularly known as the Dawes Act, after its champion in
the Senate, Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. 2 ' Historians still debate the
motivations behind the Dawes Act. To some, the threat to the Indian land
base and tribal integrity was not sufficient to warrant a wholesale retreat from
the system by which Indian-white relations had been conducted in the past.
Others argue that the friends of the Indians acted just in time to save them
from being totally deprived of their remaining lands. Scholars have attempted
to find evidence of selfish interests steering the legislation to enactment, but
so far no one has been able to demonstrate that the act was the result of the
improper influence of railroads, miners, settlers, or others who stood to profit
from the results of allotment. The principal force behind the law was the vast
20.
21.

See W. WASHBURN, supra note 18.
Ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 288, as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
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corps of Indian rights organizations who convinced themselves that allotment
and assimilation were the only solutions to the Indian "problem."
The Dawes Act was addressed not only to the issue of collective landholding but to the issues of tribal organization and the legal status of individual
Indians. Increasingly during this period, the movement was toward the exercise of federal, as opposed to tribal, jurisdiction over individual Indians and
toward inclusion of the Indians within the body politic as full citizens. In
these issues, as in those concerning land tenure, policy and circumstance
deeply influenced one another.
From the earliest period of American colonial history, individual Indians
had entered into a wide range of associations with whites. For the most part
these relationships were characterized by inequality and political separation.
Even the Indian converts in the "Praying Towns" of seventeenth-century Massachusetts lived not as fully equal citizens within the Puritan Commonwealth
but as carefully controlled associates.2 2 In later years, some Indians became
members of white communities by virtue of the allotment provisions of early
treaties, or by individual choice. However, the legal status of such individuals
was rarely subject to thoughtful analysis as long as their numbers were small
and the Indian nations continued to exist as separate and isolated enclaves.
But as pressures mounted for the breakup of tribal lands and whites came
to live in greater proximity to western Indian settlements, some clarification
of the legal status of the individual Indian became necessary. Legislation affecting the Indian's legal status was stimulated by two dramatic cases occurring in 1883 and 1884, in the midst of the debate over the breakup of the
reservations and the destruction of tribal authority. The decision in Elk v.
Wilkins23 played a significant role in shaping the Dawes Act, while the case of
Ex Parte Crow Dog 24 inspired legislation concerning criminal jurisdiction over
individual Indians.
In the case of Elk v. Wilkins, the plaintiff, an Indian who had voluntarily
separated himself from his tribe and taken up residence among the white
citizens of Omaha, Nebraska, was denied the right to register to vote by Wilkins, the local registrar, on the grounds that he was not a citizen of the United
States. The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, though two justices
dissented. The decision in Elk acutely embarrassed the proponents of severalty
legislation. Their argument that tribalism had to be destroyed in order to
allow the individual Indian to assume his rightful place in white society
seemed, in the light of the Supreme Court's decision, either false, hypocritical,
or both. If the Indian were to lose his tribal affiliation and to move into white
22. See, e.g., Kawashima, Legal Origins of the Indian Reservation in Colonial Massachusetts, 13 Am.
J. LEGAL HIsT. 42 (1969); Kawashima, Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts Over the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763, 42 NEw ENGLAND Q. no. 4, at 532-55 (1969).
23. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
24. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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society, he would be left in limbo. Friends of the Indian protested vigorously
against the Elk decision. At the same time they encouraged Senator Dawes to
write into the severalty legislation the provision that every Indian born within
25
the territorial limits of the United States,
*..to whom allotments shall have been made tinder the provisions of this act,
or tinder any law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits
of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted
the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United
States ....
The Dawes Act did not fully resolve the "problem" of reconciling the
Indian's status as an Indian with his status as a citizen of the United States. It
took another historical event (rather than logic or theory) to stimulate Congress to clarify the status of the individual Indian. In 1924 the Congress declared citizens all Indians not already so designated." The remarkable role
played by Indians in World War I, both on the battlefield and in the domestic
war effort, made their exclusion from full participation in the political process
seem arbitrary and unjust. From the white point of view, the bravery and
dedication of Indians in World War 1-whether based on the warrior values
of Indian culture or other motivations-compounded the injustice of their
exclusion from the country's politics, particularly at a time when America welcomed to full political equality millions of immigrants from Europe. 2 7 Just as
Elk v. Wilkins stimulated further consideration of the citizenship status of Indians, Ex Parte Crow Dog raised the issue of criminal jurisdiction over individual Indians.
Crow Dog had killed Spotted Tail, a fellow Sioux, within the reservation
boundaries in retaliation for the latter's appropriating the wife of Crow Dog's
friend. Although the Sioux had imposed their own justice, federal agents arrested Crow Dog and charged him with murder. He appealed for a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
crimes committed by one Indian against another in Indian country. The Supreme Court agreed with Crow Dog's argument and set him free, noting that
any prosecution must be pressed within the judicial system of the tribe. The
25. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390.
26. Act of June 2, 1924. ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 140(a)(2) (1970).
27. See W. WASHBURN, supra note 14, at 252. The 1924 declaration of Indian citizenship did
not, however, clarify all confusion concerning the rights and duties of Indian citizens. It did not,
for example, clarify the issue of eligibility to vote in state elections. Thus, as late as the 1950s,
some states, particularly in the southwest, refused to recognize Indians living on reservations as
'residents" for voting purposes. See, e.g., Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d 490 (1956);
Rothfels v. Southworth, I I Utah 2d 169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960). The Utah statute was later repealed.
The fact that reservation Indians are exempt from state and local taxes but are eligible to stand
for office and vote in those areas continues to disturb neighboring whites. Navajos Who Pay No
Tax Seek County Role in Arizona, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1974, at 24, col. 3; Shirley v. Superior
Couri, 109 Ariz. 510, 513 P.2d 939 (1973).
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response of Congress, outraged at the latitude thus conceded to the tribes,
was to pass the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which extended federal criminal
jurisdiction to the seven major crimes of murder, manslaughter, rape, assault
28
with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
Congress did not, however, move to assert full jurisdiction over all reservation activities. Owing, in part, to successful experiments by local agents with
tribal police and tribal judges, bureaucrats and legislators gave support to tribal institutions which contributed to the reduction in Indian-white tensions.
Because there was no comprehensive theory of federal-Indian relations guiding policy in every domain of Indian life, indigenous institutions were able to
survive even in the face of the dominant, if loosely articulated, program of
individualized allotment and status contained in the Dawes Act.2 9
The General Allotment Act of 1887 reflected the rampant individualism
and economic laissez-faire philosophy of America at the end of the nineteenth
century. Whatever the effects of that philosophy in other areas of American
economic life its particular form of application to the Indians proved totally
unsuccessful. Already by the 1920s it was clear that Indians were not developing into prototypical American farmers: the inadequate size and quality of
allotments, the poor facilities for health and education, and the positive attachment of Indians to their tribal identities contributed to this situation.
When Lewis Merriam's famous report to the Secretary of the Interior was
published in 1928, recognition of the failure of American Indian policy was
required. Just as the philosophy of laissez-faire economics influenced the
formulation of the Dawes Act, so too the next major piece of legislation, the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, was influenced by the reconsideration of
the ethic during the Great Depression.
For many Americans during the years of the Depression collectivism,
whether of the Soviet variety or of the traditional native American variety,
suddenly had new appeal. John Collier, who was selected as Commissioner of
Indian Affairs by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, had been deeply influenced in his earlier years by the
communal values he had observed in Indian societies of the southwest. In
devising a new policy for the Indian as part of the general restructuring of
American society in the period of the New Deal, Collier sought to reestablish
3
these values throughout the Indian segment of American society .
28.

23 Stat. 385, The Major Crimes Act has been amended on numerous occasions since. The

present version covers thirteen crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). There is, however, some question
whether the act confers exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction on the federal courts. Cf. 1 INDIAN L.
REP. no. 3, at 52 (1974). The CriminalJustice Reform Act, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1975),
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Collier's dream of a "red Atlantis"-as one scholar has termed it-came
near to realization. 3 ' But the program ran up against the very individualism
which Collier's predecessors had successfully fostered in many American Indian tribes. Collier's attempt to ban the inheritance of lands already allotted to
individual Indians (coupled with his proposed ban on further allotments and
the return to communal ownership of all surplus Indian lands) was met by
bitter opposition in areas like Oklahoma, where many Indians thought more
of their newly gained individual property than of tribal integrity. The aim
of the nineteenth-century reformers-to encourage individualistic values
-had, Collier recognized to his sorrow, been partially realized. The new cultural climate in many Indian communities caused Collier to modify his plan to
return individual land holdings to communal ownership. Instead he made
particular efforts to maintain as fully communal societies those tribes the aridity of whose lands had made application of the acreage provisions of the General Allotment Act patently impractical. Collier also sought authorization for
the purchase on the open market of individual land holdings that could then
be returned to tribal control.32
As part of his scheme for strengthening Indian communal societies, Collier encouraged the revitalization of tribal governments, hitherto the object of
direct assault by all government policies. The Indian Reorganization Act gave
legal recognition to tribal governments as distinct from federal, state, and
local governments. At the same time the Act maintained and strengthened
prior recognition of the trust responsibilities of the federal government to the
Indians. In order to win approval for the new structure in a white dominated
legislature, Collier prescribed certain organizational procedures and forms intended to reassure Congress that responsible democratic government-as
white Americans defined it-would be established. Thus tribal leaders were to
be elected by ballot, each adult Indian man and woman having an equal vote.
Traditional methods of selection by consensus, heredity, or appointment by a
smaller element of the tribe were ignored or prohibited. Moreover, each tribe
was to draw up a constitution and a set of by-laws for the organization and
operation of tribal affairs. Not insignificantly, the Secretary of the Interior
was made the reviewing officer for many of the processes by which tribal
governments would function.
The provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act have been the source of
sharp conflicts within many reservation groups. For example, spokesmen for
the American Indian Movement at Pine Ridge in 1972 demanded the ouster
of the elected tribal government, the discontinuance of electoral procedures
troversy Over the Wheeler-Howard Bill of 1934, address by Kenneth R. Philp, National Archives
Conference on Research in the History of Indian-White Relations, Washington, D.C., June 16,
1972. See also W. WASHBURN, supra note 14, at 254-57.
31. Philp, supra note 30.
32. Id.
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authorized under the Act, and the return to "traditional" forms of leadership
selection. Other segments of the tribe argued that a one man/one vote system
was a more equitable method of determining leadership. The Indian Reorganization Act may or may not have contributed to internal tribal factionalism
by stressing proportion of Indian parentage for tribal membership or highlighting degrees of assimilation to white values. But what is certain is that the
Act has, during a crucial period in American Indian history, preserved and
strengthened the concept of tribal authority. "As a reform measure," writes
Vine Deloria, Jr., "Collier's original draft of the Indian Reorganization Act
was so thoughtful, philosophical, and ahead of its time that it had a hard time
gaining credibility. ' 33 Indeed, says Deloria, "Collier had more faith in Indians
than they had in themselves." 34 He concludes: "The present contention of
Indian activists and others that the Indian Reorganization Act was a step away
from the traditional right of Indians to govern themselves is inaccurate if they
mean that the scope of legal powers was reduced by the adoption of the
act."

35

The Indian Reorganization Act remains the guiding expression of federal
Indian policy. Although Congress acted in 1953 to terminate federal services
and jurisdiction over Indians as rapidly as possible, the economic hardship
accompanying that policy has led to its subsequent rejection. 6 And the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 3 7 which extended most of the constitutional requirements of the Bill of Rights to reservation groups, has raised difficult
issues of the relations between organized tribal governments and their individual members. Throughout, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the concept
of tribal authority, even though its precise boundaries and implications have
38
been the subject of extensive litigation.
American Indian policy has, therefore, been an amalgam of insight and
greed, implicit bias and practical concern. At its best, it has developed in response to mutual understanding rather than blind adherence to abstract doctrine. Internal disputes will continue within Indian communities, but the fact
that the Indian tribe has survived as a viable legal entity in our day is a tribute to the good will and dedication of men like Governor William Bradford
of Plymouth Colony in the seventeenth century and John Collier in the twen33. V. DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 196 (1974).
34. Id. at 199.
35. Id. at 204.
36. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953). This led to termination statutes such as 25
U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1954). The Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. 1I, 1974) has
since repealed this termination statute. See generally Orfield, A Study of the Termination Policy, in 4
SUBCOMM.
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QUESTION 673 (1970). See also FREEDOM WITH RESERVATION:
THEIR LAND AND PEOPLE (D. Shames ed. 1972).
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38.
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THE ORGANIZATION
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25 U.S.C. §§ 132-03 (1970).
See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comu'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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tieth; and to the practical, non-theoretical ideology of the
and officials who established the American nation. The legal
United States with the American Indians reinforces Justice
Holmes's dictum that "[t]he life of law has not been logic:
perience."3 9
39.

O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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